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 Abstract 23 
The introduction of the punitive measures to control outbreaks of measles in Europe has sparked debate 24 
and public protest about the ethical justification of penalties and exclusionary processes for non-25 
immunization. This article advances an ethics framework related to compulsory vaccination policies, 26 
which we use to analyse three case studies, of mandatory policies that are enforced by fines; of policies 27 
that require vaccination for the provision of social goods; and of community-led policies in which 28 
communities themselves decide how to enforce vaccination compliance. We report on contemporary, 29 
ongoing and past measures that have been used to increase vaccine uptake, consider their rational and 30 
the related public responses, elaborate on socio-cultural and contextual influences and discuss the 31 
ethical justification for mandatory vaccination. We argue for a measured approach that protects 32 
fundamental human rights to evidence-based information and medical counsel to support health 33 
decision-making and simultaneously raises awareness about the role of immunization in protecting the 34 
wider community. We think more emphasis needs to be placed on immunization as a means of 35 
promoting social good, reducing harm and protecting vulnerable groups. 36 
  37 
 Key points for decision-makers 38 
 More emphasis needs to be placed on immunization as a moral duty; a means to promote 39 
social good, to reduce harm and protect vulnerable groups.  40 
 It is reasonable to restrict access to public institutions (e.g. schools) with appropriate recourse 41 
for medical, philosophical and religious exemptions in contexts where vaccination coverage is 42 
low and outbreaks likely.  43 
 Vaccine mandates must be undergirded by tailored and socio-cultural appropriate 44 
immunization information materials, counsel and complemented by strategies to augment trust 45 
in immunisation. 46 
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Introduction  47 
The recent introduction of the punitive measures to control outbreaks of measles in Europe and similar 48 
action in other parts of the world has sparked debate and public protest about the ethical justification of 49 
penalties and exclusionary processes for non-immunization. It remains to be seen if mandatory 50 
measures will sufficiently boost vaccination coverage and it would be unwise to assume the measures 51 
will achieve the desired outcomes seamlessly(1). For example, Italy saw sizable public protests in 2017 52 
against mandatory vaccination(2). Public resistance to mandatory vaccination has a long history. The 53 
enforcement of smallpox vaccination in 1854 in England backfired initially, resulting in a decrease of 54 
uptake and increase in smallpox related mortality. Uptake rates improved over time however and other 55 
European countries with compulsory smallpox immunization had lower associated mortality rates by the 56 
1870s (3). However, the legal enforcement of smallpox vaccination in England provided significant 57 
impetus for the birth of the anti-vaccination movement in England which was influential in the 19th and 58 
start of the 20th century (4, 5).   59 
 60 
This article advances an ethics framework related to compulsory vaccination policies, which we use to 61 
analyse three case studies, of mandatory policies that are enforced by fines; of policies that require 62 
vaccination for the provision of social goods; and of community led policies in which communities 63 
themselves decide how to enforce vaccination compliance. 64 
 65 
Ethics framework 66 
 67 
It is widely accepted that the State has a duty to take measures to curb the spread of communicable 68 
diseases, especially where these are diseases of high morbidity and mortality. Such duties can be 69 
justified both via the human right to health, and by the more general consideration that the State has a 70 
duty to protect the common good (6-8).  In discharging the duty to protect the common good, States 71 
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need to be mindful of other rights that individuals have. Rights to liberty, to privacy, and to autonomy 72 
can all potentially be violated by public health policies that are too single-minded in their protection of 73 
public health (9). 74 
  75 
Population level vaccination policies present a particularly challenging combination of opportunities and 76 
challenges from the perspective of the State. Vaccination is an important opportunity, because it is 77 
generally very cost-effective. Where herd immunity can be ensured, it also provides effective ways of 78 
protecting the most vulnerable. Vaccination also presents an important challenge, because population 79 
level vaccination programmes target those who are asymptomatic and include in their coverage those 80 
who would be at low risk. Moreover, there is a persistent minority in many States with philosophical or 81 
religious objections to vaccination. 82 
  83 
Different vaccination programmes will have different profiles of risk and benefit. Where a disease is 84 
non-communicable (such as tetanus), the benefits of vaccination accrue only to the vaccinated 85 
individual; whereas in cases of communicable diseases establishing herd immunity can be vital, 86 
especially when some people are not able to be vaccinated. This means that ethical arguments that 87 
might support mandatory measles vaccination will often not support mandatory tetanus vaccination: 88 
something that raises interesting ethical questions given that tetanus is often bundled together into a 89 
pentavalent vaccine with vaccines for Diphtheria, Hepatitis B, Pertussis, and haemophilus influenzae 90 
B(10).  91 
 92 
The reasons for inadequate vaccine coverage rates which increases the risk of contracting diseases are 93 
manifold. They include the “three Cs” of complacency, confidence and convenience. Complacency exists 94 
where perceived risks of vaccine-preventable diseases are low, and immunisation is not deemed a 95 
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necessary preventative action. Confidence relates to levels of public confidence in the vaccine, providers 96 
as well as other actors and the politics surrounding vaccination programmes. Convenience encompasses 97 
the physical availability, geographic accessibility and affordability of vaccines as well as people’s health 98 
literacy and ability to understand the value of immunisation services(11). These factors are viewed as 99 
core to vaccine decision-making and related behaviours and are used to help understand why vaccine 100 
uptake might be low in some contexts, as such they are constituents of a model of vaccine hesitancy. 101 
The continuum of vaccine hesitancy between full acceptance of vaccines and outright refusal of all 102 
vaccines is actually quite broad(11), and as indicated by the three ‘Cs’ is not only attributable to 103 
concerns about vaccination but can also be explained by difficulties in being able to access vaccines.  104 
 105 
The requirement to ensure herd immunity and maintain high vaccine coverage rates interacts in 106 
problematic ways with vaccine hesitancy. If vaccine hesitancy is widespread, this may be perceived to 107 
make policies of mandatory vaccination necessary; but the fact of widespread vaccine hesitancy may 108 
itself undermine the perceived political legitimacy of so doing. What is required is an approach that 109 
adequately reconciles the goals of public health with the diverse other goals of citizens and of States 110 
(12).  111 
 112 
We argue that the best way to do this is to pursue a synergistic and proportionate approach. First, 113 
synergistic, that public health policy should aim, where possible, to enhance and strengthen other goals 114 
that citizens have reason to value; for example, aiming at promoting upstream determinants of health 115 
such as education that empower citizens to make healthy choices. Second, policies should be 116 
proportionate insofar as where the protection and promotion of health does come into conflict with 117 
other goals, it should do so in a way that these conflicts are minimised. 118 
  119 
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In dealing with conflicts, we argue for the following principles. 120 
  121 
1. The size of benefit to be gained or size of harm to be avoided by a given vaccination policy 122 
matters. Other things being equal, the greater the expected benefit and the greater the 123 
expected harm to be avoided, the stronger the argument in favour of an intervention(10). 124 
2. The extent to which the population endorses or consents to the policy matters. Other things 125 
being equal, the greater percentage of the affected population who endorse an intervention 126 
(and the more enthusiastically they do so) the stronger the reason in favour of the policy. 127 
3. The ability to make autonomous choices matters. Other things being equal, the more significant 128 
a choice is, the more important it is that a person has the opportunity to make a genuine or 129 
authentic choice and the more problematic it is to interfere with their choice. 130 
4. Liberty matters. Other things being equal, the more coercive a policy is, the more problematic it 131 
is (13).  132 
  133 
Some cases of vaccination policies will be clear cut: where a policy that will bring a great benefit, which 134 
is supported by a majority, and involves only a mild interference with choices which are not generally 135 
thought to be significant, the intervention will be easy to justify. Where a policy will bring only a small 136 
benefit and is opposed the majority, and involves a coercive interference with significant choices, then 137 
the intervention will definitely not be justified. 138 
  139 
The more interesting cases—which this article focuses on—will be those within the middle. Ethical 140 
reasoning alone will not be able to give universal answers to these questions, because which 141 
interferences are justifiable depends (among other things) on the level of general consent to the policy, 142 
and the significance of the choices interfered with. The level of consent will obviously vary relative to 143 
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culture and time; and we will also have to take account of local differences in which choices are believed 144 
by particular communities to be significant. Because of the importance of contextual factors, the body of 145 
this article examines several country case studies, which each raise different questions of culture, 146 
political organisation, and level of consent. 147 
  148 
Case studies 149 
Italy and France: reinforcing mandatory policies in response to disease outbreaks 150 
Italy and France reinforced mandatory vaccination in September 2017 and January 2018, respectively. 151 
However, Italy reversed changes following an election in August 2018. The reasons for strengthening 152 
mandatory policies were that both countries had struggled with stagnating and declining uptake of 153 
childhood vaccines, with coverage remaining below WHO targets for some of them (14, 15). This 154 
transpired through an increase in the number of measles cases and an amplification of the magnitude of 155 
measles outbreaks across Europe, which led both countries to increase the number of mandatory 156 
vaccines to 11 in France and 10 in Italy (including measles). 157 
 158 
Italy has a history of mandatory vaccination and the decision to widen the existing mandate in 2017 159 
came from the Ministry of Health and the Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic to “safeguard 160 
health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective interest” (16). This top-down approach 161 
meant that mandatory vaccination became a central argument in the latest political elections, with 162 
populist parties the Five-Star Movement and the Northern League promising the people that it would 163 
scrap the law once in power. This promise was fulfilled at the beginning of August 2018 (17),  but not in 164 
time for the start of the school year which left many parents unclear about their obligations to vaccinate 165 
their children in relation to school entry. Italian vaccine policy decision-making assumed a political 166 
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dimension with politicians seeking to seek the approval of those with diverse views concerning 167 
immunisation.  168 
 169 
In France, public health law has typically emphasised individual autonomy. The decision to increase the 170 
number of mandatory vaccines (until coverage rates reach satisfactory targets) came from a citizen 171 
consultation and an approach of participatory politics (15, 18). It was also aimed at addressing vaccine 172 
hesitancy by sending a signal to the wider population that vaccination is a social good and a vital part of 173 
public health. Previous confidence crises around Hepatitis B and A, H1N1 vaccination highlighted the 174 
need for more transparency and engagement of both the general public and healthcare workers in 175 
decision-making around vaccination. The report from the citizen consultation states that the 11 vaccines 176 
should remain mandatory only until coverage and confidence have increased and are back to acceptable 177 
levels. 178 
 179 
In both countries, the new mandatory policies required children to be vaccinated to attend school, 180 
unless they have a medical contraindication. In France, children can be denied entry if they are not 181 
vaccinated within three months of admission and parents might face a fine or imprisonment (19). In Italy 182 
however, children could still attend school provided their parents pay a fine and speak to their local 183 
vaccine providers (20). 184 
 185 
The impact of the laws has been different in both countries. In Italy, large ‘Vaccine Freedom Marches’ 186 
took place in the summer of 2017 in response to the introduction of the new law, which had initially 187 
made 12 vaccinations mandatory. This public protest was as much a defiant vocal defence of civil 188 
liberties as a demonstration of vaccine hesitancy, although the anti-vaccine movement in Italy has a 189 
strong foothold.  As a result of the marches the Italian government relaxed its planned laws, dropped 190 
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the rates of proposed fines, reduced the number of mandatory vaccines to 10 and scrapped the 191 
obligation to report parents who don't comply with the law to authorities - a move which could, in 192 
extreme cases, have left parents at risk of losing custody (21). However, the mandatory policies (which 193 
have now been reversed) did result in increases of vaccine coverage (20). In France, experts have raised 194 
concerns that the new law could polarize opinions on vaccination but the impact remains to be seen 195 
(15).  196 
  197 
USA: Mandating with exemptions   198 
The United States of America (USA) has a longer history of applying different measures for encouraging 199 
and enforcing immunization and since vaccines fall under the public health jurisdiction of individual 200 
States, there is some variation in immunization laws and requirements (22-24). Mandatory vaccination 201 
dates from 1809 when Massachusetts legislated compulsory smallpox vaccination and the Supreme 202 
Court upheld individuals’ rights to pass compulsory immunization laws in 1905 and 1922. Compulsory 203 
vaccination became more commonplace from the 1960s/70s when it was associated with efforts to 204 
eliminate measles transmission in school settings(25).  205 
 206 
All States require children to be fully immunized before starting school but most States allow for 207 
medical, religious or philosophical exemptions(26). Almost all States grant religious exemptions for 208 
persons who have deeply held religious beliefs in opposition to immunization. Eighteen States allow 209 
philosophical exemptions, which allow parents to decline immunization for their children because of 210 
personal, moral or other beliefs. However, in the case of Virginia this exemption applies only to the 211 
Human Papilloma Virus Vaccine, and in Missouri this exemption only applies to child care facilities and 212 
not to public schools. In some States, for example, Mississippi, West Virginia and California, only medical 213 
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exemptions have been allowed(27). The process for obtaining exemptions also varies from State to 214 
State. Some States require special paper-work, and others allow simple parental declarations(22). 215 
 216 
The ease by which you can obtain exemptions in individual  States has been shown to have a correlation 217 
with disease prevalence rates, which suggests that making it more difficult for parents to opt out 218 
increases vaccine uptake (28). Recent research also indicates that children who are exempted from 219 
immunisation are 22 times more likely to acquire measles and 6 times more likely to acquire pertussis 220 
than immunised children (29). The incidence rates of measles and pertussis in vaccinated children who 221 
live in areas with higher numbers of exempted children are also higher, which raises questions about 222 
how granting exemptions for some children can place others at increased risk of contracting disease 223 
(29).  224 
 225 
Rural area in Ethiopia: Promoting shared responsibility for immunization 226 
Significant emphasis is placed on promoting shared individual, community and governmental 227 
responsibility for immunization against vaccine preventable diseases in the Global Vaccine Action Plan 228 
(30). Projects that seek to engender shared responsibility for vaccination can however result in 229 
unexpected by-products, as was the case in a community engagement immunization project in north-west 230 
Ethiopia (31). Active engagement of health development army members and kebele (smallest 231 
administrative unit in Ethiopia) leaders in promoting immunization resulted in action that was not planned 232 
by the project implementers. This was a community self-regulation strategy which involved sanctions for 233 
non-immunization that were agreed by kebele members and applied by the kebele leadership without 234 
input from district health officers or the project implementers. They were issued where there was 235 
evidence of complete disregard of guidance provided by health workers and were not limited to vaccine 236 
default but also covered health facility non-attendance for childbirth. The latter was the only instance 237 
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cited where a monetary penalty of 500 Ethiopian Birr (approximately US$18) had been issued. With 238 
regards to vaccination, sanctions mainly served as a deterrent, a last resort for persistent non-immunisers. 239 
This self-regulation strategy provided evidence that the community engagement project had fostered 240 
shared responsibility for immunization, but it also raised questions about: i) who is qualified to determine 241 
the type of sanctions that should be applied, ii) if monetary, who collects fines and how should they be 242 
invested, iii) at what level of the health system should these types of measures be ratified? 243 
This community action is interesting in that it is decided at a more local level rather than imposed by 244 
higher levels of the health ministry or government. To what extent it was completely democratic is up for 245 
question, but the research findings suggested that the sanctions were endorsed by a variety of community 246 
members and suggested by members of the health development army who work closely with mothers in 247 
neighbouring households (31). Hence, although this community self-regulating exercise did give rise to 248 
questions about the coercion and individual rights, it encroached less on civil liberties in that the sanctions 249 
were agreed in keeping with pre-existing community accountability mechanisms, which involve 250 
community members and representatives.   251 
 252 
Discussion  253 
The recent move towards tougher vaccination policies is indicative that health professionals and 254 
government leaders feel that they have not succeeded at communicating the public health value of 255 
immunization and have to resort to more coercive action to prevent further measles outbreaks and 256 
enable programmes to achieve WHO vaccine coverage recommendations. There is also a sense of 257 
fatigue over stagnating uptake rates in countries that pioneered early vaccines and where the 258 





As the three case studies reveal, there are different tools that can be used by authorities wishing to 262 
ensure adequate levels of vaccine coverage to ensure herd immunity. These include building trust in 263 
immunization as a social good, mobilising social norms to express social disapproval of vaccine hesitancy 264 
which are implicit goals of the French mandates, making access to some public services (e.g. schools and 265 
kindergarten) dependent on vaccination as is the case in the USA, community designed sanctions as 266 
documented in the Ethiopian case study, and the use of fines as instigated in the 2017 Italian vaccine 267 
mandates.  268 
 269 
Where it is feasible to maintain adequate rates of vaccination without resorting to mandatory measures, 270 
then this is to be preferred. This follows both from our ethical framework, and from more general policy 271 
considerations. Any ethics approach needs to take seriously the need to justify to individuals who are 272 
coerced why the State is acting as it is. Given that enforced vaccination will (a) infringe on the bodily 273 
integrity of individuals and (b) will be strongly resisted by some for reasons of religion or personal belief 274 
(these reasons correspond to liberty and to autonomy in our ethics framework) the authority would 275 
need to be able to show that the interference was not disproportionate. Where herd immunity would 276 
be achievable without such measures it seems very likely that it would be judged disproportionate. So 277 
we would agree with Verweij and Dawson (32) that participation in vaccination programmes “should, 278 
generally, be voluntary unless compulsory vaccination is essential to prevent a concrete and serious 279 
harm.”  280 
 281 
From a policy perspective, it is important to reflect on the experiences in Italy and elsewhere, which 282 
should remind us that introducing a coercive policy without the relevant social licence to enforce it can 283 
undermine the public trust necessary to ensure high vaccination rates. So, the best situation is one 284 
where mandatory vaccination is not required; and where even if mandatory measures are required, the 285 
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policy should be undergirded by a commitment to building trust in immunisation and understanding of 286 
immunization as a social good.  287 
 288 
However, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that mandating vaccination is always unethical. 289 
Where there are specific contexts in which there is no other way of controlling outbreaks, then 290 
mandating vaccination can be proportionate. Justifying policies of mandated vaccination requires 291 
balancing the health benefit to be achieved against the reduction in liberty and autonomy and doing so 292 
in a way that can be seen to be fair. Given the ideal of social trust, we would recommend that 293 
mandatory systems of vaccinations (e.g. French case study) should be temporary and kept under review. 294 
As Colgrove (10) argues, there is case to be made for mandatory policies to be closely aligned with 295 
persuasive action that encourages parents to immunise their children.  296 
 297 
An important prerequisite for mandatory vaccination campaigns is an adequate scheme of vaccine 298 
surveillance and compensation for vaccine-caused harms. Although some claims of harms from 299 
vaccination made by anti-vaccination campaigners are clearly unsubstantiated it is widely accepted that 300 
vaccines can have side effects, most of which are mild and time limited, however more severe and rare 301 
and unexpected side-effects can occur. A documented example of the latter is the increase in incidence 302 
of intussusception in infants following the administration of a rotavirus vaccine (RotaShield©, Wyeth) 303 
which led to the withdrawal of this vaccine from the market (33).  This withdrawal happened very 304 
quickly due to the effective post-licensure vaccine safety monitoring administered by the US Centers for 305 
Disease Control and Prevention. Such monitoring, which is core to vaccine surveillance is a critical aspect 306 
of immunization programme management. If vaccination is to be enforced there is a clear case for a 307 
national vaccination injury compensation programme. All G8 countries apart from Canada and Russia 308 




Mandatory vaccination policies also need to take a stance on exemptions. Navin and Largent (35)  311 
helpfully distinguish three types of strategies for managing objections: Eliminationism (not allowing non-312 
medical exemptions), Prioritizing Religion (allowing only religious based exemptions, and not ones based 313 
on other personal beliefs), and Inconvenience (allowing both religious and personal belief based 314 
exemptions, but making it inconvenient enough to receive such an exemption that those whose 315 
objection is not strongly-held are likely to be deterred).  316 
 317 
Where a policy is one to which someone has a genuine objection of conscience, it is a serious matter to 318 
mandate overriding this objection; as in the Italian case, the perception of State over-reach may have 319 
made the mandatory policy (that has now been reversed) counterproductive. So, we think that there are 320 
reasons to allow some non-medical exemptions in most cases. It is difficult to articulate what makes an 321 
objection a religious one, and within the context of a secular State it is also difficult to justify why 322 
religious objections should be afforded a special status. So, we think it is difficult to justify prioritising 323 
religion. To the extent that there is a worry about too many people claiming exemptions, it would be 324 
better to keep a cap on numbers in a way that is neutral between religious and nonreligious reasons, 325 
perhaps by making exemption less convenient. An example of a religious reason for declining an 326 
immunisation or seeking an exemption from participating in a vaccine programme is the intranasal 327 
influenza vaccine, which contains porcine gelatine as a stabilizer. When the primary school age influenza 328 
vaccine programme was piloted and introduced in England it was met by resistance from Muslim and 329 
Jewish population groups(36). Not all members of these groups refused the vaccine for their child, but 330 
many did choose to forgo the vaccine, and some questioned why they were not offered the inactivated 331 
vaccine (which does not contain porcine gelatine) which is used in the Flu programme for other age and 332 
risk groups.  Some were also precluded from making an active decision for their children when religious 333 
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schools refused to support this school-based immunisation programme. From a public health 334 
perspective, the health agency responsible for the vaccination programme was assured that children 335 
who did not receive the vaccine would benefit from herd immunity achieved as part of the programme. 336 
Especially since this programme did not require high levels of uptake to achieve herd immunity. At an 337 
individual level Muslim parents weighed up whether they thought that influenza was serious enough for 338 
them to contravene religious ordinances, or whether they were sufficiently concerned to obtain the 339 
inactivated vaccine privately for their child.  This example raises several issues regarding equity and 340 
health protection and State responsibility to provide immunisations that are acceptable for all groups, 341 
and parents’ individual rights to decide whether their child should receive a vaccine. It could be argued 342 
that schools which refused to support the programme were restricting access to public health 343 
interventions and should have signposted parents to this programme and how they could access an 344 
influenza vaccine for their child even if they were unwilling to host immunisation teams at their schools.  345 
 346 
The main reasoning given for the sanctions in the Ethiopian case study was to maintain and secure 347 
respect for valuable health resources which were recently established at kebele level as part of the 348 
Ethiopian Health Extension Programme. This is pertinent since it matches an approach proposed by 349 
Patryn and Zagaya (37), who discuss questions of coercion and enforcement in a review of vaccine 350 
related sanctions (welfare cuts, fines, exclusion from schools and theme parks and restrictions on 351 
freedom) applied in  different countries. They suggest an approach, whereby individuals are required to 352 
contribute to treatment costs if they contract the illness for which they refused immunization. This 353 
argument corresponds with the desire to protect and respect health resources observed in the 354 
community self-regulation applied in Ethiopia, and provides an alternative approach to sanctions, which 355 
are hard to apply fairly and not always effective (38). However, this approach may be problematic to 356 
apply across different health systems, specifically the NHS in England, which offers free care at the point 357 
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of access to its citizens. It could also be difficult to administer for example, in cases where the cause of 358 
illness is not easy to define, the patient is seriously ill and not in a position to provide a financial 359 
contribution, and where someone is responsible for infecting others.  360 
 361 
Conclusion: the need for a measured approach and further debate 362 
So, what is the answer? Is there a place for penalties for non-compliance? We have argued for a measured 363 
approach that protects fundamental human rights to evidence-based information and medical counsel to 364 
support health decision-making and raise awareness about the role of immunization in protecting the 365 
wider community. We think more emphasis needs to be placed on immunization as a means of promoting 366 
social good, reducing harm and protecting vulnerable groups. This is of importance with reference to 367 
highly infectious diseases such as measles which can have serious sequelae for susceptible populations, 368 
especially those who cannot be immunized due to underlying medical conditions. There needs to be a 369 
franker discussion about the moral duty to prevent harm by being vaccinated and the consequences of 370 
refusing vaccination both for individuals and their social networks. We feel less comfortable about the 371 
introduction of fines, and laws that require intermediaries to report vaccine refusers to health authorities. 372 
There could however be a case for mandating immunization as an entrance requirement to educational 373 
establishments with appropriate recourse for medical, philosophical and religious exemptions.  Any type 374 
of exclusionary mechanisms must however be undergirded by tailored and socio-cultural appropriate 375 
immunization information materials, counsel and vaccination services. The immunization experience 376 
needs to be positive and potential vaccine beneficiaries need the opportunity to voice hesitation and 377 
receive appropriate and sensitive guidance.  While there is a place for mandatory measures, these need 378 
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